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ABSTRACT 
 
     We study the relationship between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and their 
stock recommendations. We hypothesize that analysts who give optimistic 
recommendations are more likely to have positive forecast errors, and analysts who 
give pessimistic recommendations tend to have negative forecast errors. This 
consistency in behaviour should be driven either by the objectivity illusion, or simply 
because of analysts’ rationality. Our regression results generally support the tendency 
of analysts’ to provide consistent estimates across these two tasks (ACAT). We also 
find that analyst’s consistency is independent at the analyst-firm level, meaning that 
ACAT is an analyst-firm characteristic. 
 
Keywords:  Earnings forecasts; Recommendations; Analysts’ Rationality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
     This paper examines the consistency between analysts’ earnings forecast errors 
and recommendations. We expect that analysts who give buy recommendations tend 
to have higher forecast earnings than actual earnings (i.e., positive forecast errors), 
and analysts who give sell recommendations tend to have lower forecasts than actual 
earnings (i.e., negative forecast errors). 
     We study a five-year broker-analyst data set and get the results that generally 
support our predictions based on the objectivity illusion and analysts’ rationale. 
Objectivity illusion suggests that analysts tend to unconsciously achieve the 
consistency between their earnings forecast errors and recommendations. However, in 
some cases, analysts who give consistent earnings forecasts with recommendations 
are rational. Even though the two-by-two matrix of the categorized forecast errors and 
recommendations shows that only 44% of the total observations have consistent 
earnings forecast errors and recommendations, the two-sample t-tests on the two 
variables tend to reveal a positive relationship between analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors and recommendations. To further study the relationship, however, we perform 
several regressions to test the degree of ACAT hypothesis. The simplest linear 
regression between forecast errors and recommendations has a significant positive 
slope level, which suggests a significant positive linear relationship between the two 
variables. To make sure that we are not simply proxying for unobserved analyst- 
characteristics and firm-characteristics that may be capturing information asymmetry, 
we also include year, frim and analyst fixed-effects and find similar results. When we 
control for both analyst and firm fixed-effects, the relationship between the two 
variables disappears. 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS  
     Prior research on motivated reasoning indicates that people are more likely to 
arrive at their desired conclusion (Kunda, 1990). Research has also found that 
analysts have unconscious bias to support their recommendations when they produce 
their earnings forecasts (Eames, Glover, & Kennedy, 2002). This pattern of bias is 
referred to as the objectivity illusion. Even without illusion playing a role in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and recommendations, one tends to think that rational analysts 
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should have a tendency to provide consistencies between their earnings forecasts and 
recommendations. We note that illusion implies that analysts focus on information 
that is favourable for their desired conclusions and pay less attention to other relevant 
information during their reasoning process (Eames, Glover, & Kennedy, 2002). As a 
result, they are motivated by their preferred conclusions and not knowing that they 
fail to make objective decisions. Consequently, these analysts should underperform. 
The alternative view, however, is that consistency is a worthwhile quality and it is 
independent from illusion. On such circumstances, analysts arriving at consistent 
earnings forecast and recommendation should be the better performing analysts. Prior 
research finds broker-analyst earnings forecast errors are significantly optimistic for 
buy recommendations and significantly pessimistic for sell recommendations, 
consistent with the objectivity illusion and trade boosting hypotheses (Eames, Glover, 
& Kennedy, 2002). Whether illusion plays a role or not is not the focus of the paper, 
the objective of this paper is to use the recent data from 2010 to 2014 (after financial 
crises period) to develop and test the ACAT hypothesis. In addition, the contribution 
of our study is to control for other related factors (i.e., market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio) and fixed-effect variables (i.e., year, industry, security ticker, analyst) 
that affect the relationship between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and stock 
recommendations. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
I. Sample Selection Criteria 
     We obtain individual analyst’s recommendations and annual actual and forecast 
earnings-per-share (EPS) from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S estimate database. Our 
sample period begins in January 2010 and ends in December 2014. We decided to use 
data only after the financial crises, because there was huge uncertainty during the 
financial crises and it can influence the whole analysis to a large extent. Hence, the 
study should be taken at face value and it quantifies the current state of affairs.  
      I/B/E/S Detail History database includes actual and forecast EPS. The official 
ticker is a unique identifier for each firm. The announce date is the date that the 
forecast or actual values were reported. The analyst code is used to identify individual 
I/B/E/S analysts. Since not all firms have the same fiscal year end, Thomson Reuters 
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uses forecast period indicator to identify estimates for each period. We focus on 
forecasts of the one-year-ahead annual earnings (FY1). We can find that some 
analysts make earnings forecasts at the same date, so we take average of those 
earnings forecasts and keep it as one observation. For each fiscal period, the estimated 
earnings include multiple forecast revisions released by analysts on various dates. To 
eliminate the most distanced earnings forecasts for each analyst and to ensure the 
comparability across analysts and firms, we filter the earnings forecasts by forecasts 
announce date, and select the observations with forecasts announce date that is prior 
and closest to the actual earnings announce date. After that, our sample of actual and 
forecast earnings-per-share contains 223,586 observations.  
     This research draws on data from the I/B/E/S Detail Recommendations database, 
which contains stock recommendations ratings issued by individual analyst from 2010 
to 2014. As many estimators have different ratings, Thomson Reuters maintains a 
standard format in I/B/E/S Text, expressed on a five-point scale where: 1.0 = Strong 
Buy, 2.0 = Buy, 3.0 = Hold, 4.0 = Underperform, 5.0 = Sell. To make interpretation 
of our results more intuitive, we reverse this coding so that higher numbers indicate 
more favourable recommendations (i.e., 1 for sell, 5 for strong buy). The database 
provides unique identifier for the individual analyst making a recommendation. For 
each fiscal period, analysts may revise their recommendations based on bad or good 
news. Therefore, for each analyst, we take average of the recommendations for a 
particular security provided by the analyst within a particular fiscal year, and only 
keep one observation of the average recommendation for that security in that year. 
This generates a sample of 185,524 observations.  
II. Computation of Explanatory Variables      
 
     Our dependent variable is earnings forecast errors by using I/B/E/S earnings-per-
share forecasts minus I/B/E/S actual earnings-per-share and scaled by the absolute 
value of actual earnings-per-share. To reduce the influence of extreme outliers, the 
earnings forecast errors are winsorized at the 99% and 1% level. Subsequently, we 
merge the two datasets of recommendations and earnings forecast errors by the 
common variables, including security ticker, year and analyst. We delete 35,694 
observations with zero forecast errors and neutral recommendations.  
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     To generate the two-by-two matrix between recommendations and earnings 
forecast errors, we divide recommendations and forecast errors into sub-groups, 
excluding the neutral recommendations and zero forecast errors. For earnings forecast 
errors (dependent variable), 1 represents positive forecast errors and 0 represents 
negative forecast errors. For recommendations (independent variable), 1 is for 
optimistic ones (i.e., buy, strong buy) and 0 is for pessimistic ones (i.e., underperform, 
sell).  
     In our research, fixed-effects are very important because our observations fall into 
different categories such as year, industry, firm and analyst. We want to control for 
characteristics of those categories and other related factors (i.e., market capitalization, 
book-to-market ratio) that might affect the relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable. The first control variable is market capitalization. 
We measure it by multiplying the absolute value of price per share and the number of 
common shares outstanding (in thousands) obtained from the Center for Research on 
Security Prices (CRSP) database. To reduce the effect of outliers, we use the 
logarithm of market capitalization in our regressions. The second control variable is 
book-to-market (BTM) ratio. The BTM is a comparison of a company’s book value to 
its market value. We obtain companies’ book value on balance sheet from the 
Compustat North America – Annual Updates database. The BTM is winsorized at the 
99% and 1% level as well to eliminate outliers. We create dummy variables that take 
the value of only 0 and 1 to represent the five years from 2010 to 2014. Furthermore, 
the four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) classifies industries based on 
common characteristics in the products, services, production and delivery system of a 
business. We only use the first two digits of the SIC code to represent major groups in 
our regression model.  
     We merged all variables into one data set. The merged sample comprises 59,290 
observations over the years 2010-2014, representing 4,698 distinct firms. Later, we 
will include the forecast errors (independent variable), recommendations (dependent 
variable) and some control variables (i.e., market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, 
year, industry, firm, analyst) in six regression models.  
      Summary statistics for the distribution of observations across fiscal years are 
reported in Panel A of Table 1. It illustrates that our sample observations are evenly 
distributed in each year. Panel B indicates that recommendations are significantly 
skewed toward buy and strong buy (77.19%), with only 10% rated underperform and 
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sell. Panel C of Table 1 presents the distribution statistics for forecast errors and 
recommendations. The mean (median) recommendation of the sample is approximate 
3.98 and the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles are 3.67 and 5 respectively, also indicating that 
buy recommendations are more frequent than sell recommendations. The mean and 
median forecast errors are 0.03 and -0.01 respectively, with a range from -1.50 to 2.93. 
It is evident that some extreme positive values affect the distribution. Furthermore, 
the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles of annual forecast errors are -0.05 and 0.34 respectively, 
showing that approximate symmetry applies to large negative and positive 
observations in the distribution. The positive kurtosis (20.82) of forecast errors 
indicates a relatively peaked distribution with close center, showing a relatively low 
standard deviation.  
 
Table 1 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year 
 
Year Observations % of Total % of Cum. 
2010 11,879 20.04 20.04 
2011 12,793 21.58 41.61 
2012 11,739 19.80 61.41 
2013 10,985 18.53 79.94 
2014 11,894 20.06 100.00 
Total 59,290 100.00  
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by IBES Recommendations (i.e., 1 for sell, 5 for strong 
buy) 
 
Recommendation Observations % of Total % of Cum. 
Strong Buy  19,017 32.07 32.07 
Buy  26,749 45.12 77.19 
Hold  7,655 12.91 90.10 
Underperform  4,657 7.85 97.96 
Sell  1,212 2.04 100 
Total 59,290 100.00  
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics on Forecast Errors (dependent variable), 
Recommendation (independent variable), Market Capitalization, and Book-to-Market 
ratio (control variables) 
 
 Mean Median Min Max Sd. Q1 Q3 Skewness Kurtosis 
Forecast Errors 0.03 -0.01 -1.50 2.93 0.46 -0.05 0.34 2.73 20.82 
Recommendations 3.98 4 1 5 0.90 3.67 5 -1.05 4.12 
Log (MC) 9.41 9.42 6.09 11.81 0.78 8.88 9.96 -0.01 2.81 
BTM 0.73 0.45 -0.19 9.95 1.23 0.25 0.79 5.55 38.59 
 
RESULTS 
I. Two-by-two Matrix and Two-sample T-tests 
     In Panel A of Table 2, the two-by-two matrix of all of the observations based on 
the categorized earnings forecast errors (i.e., positive, negative) and categorized 
recommendations (i.e., optimistic, pessimistic) shows the distribution of observations 
in each category. The percentage of consistent observations (43.71%) is less than that 
of inconsistent observations (56.29%). We note that the optimistic recommendations 
are much more than the pessimistic ones because analysts generally tend to give buy 
recommendations than sell recommendations. However, the significant Pearson chi-
squared value indicates a significant relationship between the two categorized 
variables. 
     To further explore the relationship between the recommendation type and forecast 
error, two-sample t-tests are performed and the results are shown in Panel B of Table 
2.  Firstly, we test the two sets of recommendations of the two earnings forecast error 
groups (i.e., positive, negative). The t statistic of -1.6318 is not quite significant, 
suggesting that we cannot say the mean recommendation of the positive forecast error 
group is different from that of the negative forecast error group. Also, the two means 
both represent optimistic recommendations, indicating that even analysts who have 
negative forecast errors tend to give buy recommendations. This overall tendency of 
giving optimistic recommendations rather than pessimistic ones is different from our 
expectation for ACAT hypothesis. These results are mainly due to the small 
percentage of sells recommendations in the total observations. It seems that buys 
recommendations dominate sells in both positive forecast error group and negative 
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forecast error group. To reduce the impact of buys dominating sells on the 
relationship between earnings forecast errors and recommendations, we also perform 
median tests on the two variables to find whether they are correlated. The results are 
shown in Panel C. The relatively high Pearson chi-squared values and low 
probabilities of Fisher’s exact suggest that the two variables under test are correlated. 
On the other hand, in Panel B of Table 2, the negative difference in means between 
those who have negative forecast errors and those with positive forecast errors aligns 
with what we expected. The mean recommendation of the negative forecast error 
group is higher than that of the positive forecast error group. This tends to show a 
positive relationship between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and recommendations. 
     Then we test the two sets of forecast errors of the two recommendation groups (i.e., 
buys, sells). The significant t statistic of -3.3511 indicates that the two samples have 
different means. The difference in means between those who give pessimistic 
recommendations and those give optimistic recommendations is negative. This aligns 
with our expectation that earnings forecast errors for buy and strong buy 
recommendations are higher than those for sell and strong sell recommendations. 
However, the two means are both positive, suggesting that even analysts with sell 
recommendations are likely to have positive forecast errors. This is consistent with 
prior research finding on analysts’ forecast bias that analysts are likely to provide 
optimistic earnings forecasts to improve management access (Lim, 2001). Generally 
speaking, the t-test results support a positive relationship between analysts’ forecast 
errors and recommendations. 
 
Table 2 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix between sells (i.e., sell, underperform), buys (i.e., strong 
buy, buy) and positive forecast errors, negative forecast errors, including number of 
observations and percentage (n = 59,290).  
 
 Sells  Buys  
Negative forecast errors  4,458 (7.52%) 30,505(51.45%) 
Positive forecast errors 2,872(4.84%) 21,455 (36.19%) 
 Pearson chi2 (1) = 11.8622   Pr = 0.001 
 Consistent: 7.52%+36.19%=43.71% 
Inconsistent: 51.45%+4.84%=56.29% 
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Panel B: (1) Two-sample t-test on the mean of recommendations for the two forecast 
errors groups (negative and positive). (2) Two-sample t-test on the mean of forecast 
errors for the two recommendations groups (sells and buys). 
(1) Obs Mean recommendations  t-value 
Negative forecast errors 34962 3.970 -1.6318 
Positive forecast errors 24328 3.983 
 Diff
1
 < 0  Pr(T<t) = 0.0514 
 
(2) Obs Mean forecast errors t-value 
Sells  7330 0.012 -3.3511 
Buys  51960 0.031 
 Diff
2
 < 0   Pr(T<t) = 0.0004 
 
Panel C: (1) Median test on median forecast errors for sells (i.e., sell, underperform) 
group and buys (i.e., strong buy, buy) group. (2) Median test on median 
recommendations for negative forecast error group and positive forecast error group. 
 
(1) Forecast errors Sells recommendations Buys recommendations 
Lower than the median  3,849 25,808 
Greater than the median  3,481 26,152 
 Pearson chi2 (1) = 20.7430   Pr = 0.000 
Fisher’s exact: Pr = 0.000 
 
(2) Recommendations Negative forecast errors Positive forecast errors 
Lower than the median 26,889 18,913 
Greater than the median  8,073 5,415 
 Pearson chi2 (1) = 5.6572   Pr = 0.017 
Fisher’s exact: Pr = 0.018 
 
II. Regression Analyses 
 
     Given the fact that the two-by-two matrix and two-sample t-tests reveal a positive 
relationship existing between analysts’ forecast errors and their recommendations, we 
want to further test whether ACAT holds under different conditions from industry 
level to analyst level. We decide to run several regressions using all of the 
observations to test the degree of ACAT hypothesis. Firstly, we conduct a simple 
linear regression between the two variables of earnings forecast errors and 
recommendations shown as the regression model 1 in Table 3. The output statistics 
                                                        
1 Diff = mean (negative forecast errors) – mean (positive forecast errors)  
2 Diff = mean (sells) – mean (buys)  
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reveal the significance of the coefficient on recommendations with a high t statistic of 
3.11 and a low p value of 0.002. 
     The coefficient of recommendations can be biased because we fail to include some 
related variables that are correlated with the recommendations. To reduce the omitted 
variables bias in our regression model, we decide to include market capitalization and 
book-to-market ratio to control for firm sizes in our regression shown as the 
regression model 2. In Table 3, specification 2 has a significant coefficient of 
recommendations with a relatively high t statistic of 3.08 and a low p value of 0.002. 
Hence, there is significant positive linear relationship between earnings forecast errors 
and recommendations, supporting our prediction on the relationship between the two 
variables. 
     To further control for possible omitted variables, a set of dummy variables of years 
is included in the regression model 2 to eliminate variations across different years. 
The coefficient of recommendations in specification 3 is higher with a t statistic of 
3.24 and a lower p value of 0.001. Thus, this result suggests that the relationship 
between earnings forecast errors and recommendations is a bit stronger when we 
control for the aggregate variation across years.  
     Then we consider industry fixed-effect and include dummy variable industry into 
the regression model 3 to eliminate variations across different industries. The results 
for the specification 4 still provide strong support for the hypothesis that analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors are optimistic (pessimistic) for favorable (unfavorable) stock 
recommendations with high t-value of 3.38 (p-value < 0.001). This indicates that 
analysts tend to have consistency between their earnings forecast errors and 
recommendations for firms in the same industry given in a certain year. 
     Furthermore, we take company ticker into consideration and absorb it into the 
regression model to control for firm fixed-effect, shown as regression model 5 in 
Table 3. The t statistic for the coefficient of recommendations is further increased to 
3.56. The F statistic of 3.48 is still significant, indicating high significance of the 
coefficient outputs from the regression model. Therefore, the ACAT hypothesis still 
holds when we eliminate aggregate variation across firms and years, meaning that 
analysts are consistent with their earnings forecast errors and recommendations for 
the same firm in the same year. 
     Alternatively, we only control for analyst fixed-effect and absorb analyst code into 
the regression model, shown as regression model 6 in Table 3. The coefficient of 
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recommendations in specification 6 is even higher than the previous regressions 
together with a higher t statistic for the coefficient of recommendations. This shows 
that the ACAT hypothesis also survives the analyst fixed-effect. In other words, each 
analyst tends to achieve consistency between the earnings forecast errors and 
recommendations among different firms in a given year. 
     Lastly, we control for both analyst fixed-effect and firm fixed-effect to test the 
highest degree of ACAT hypothesis. We group analyst with company ticker and 
absorb the grouped variable into the regression model 3. The coefficient of 
recommendations in specification 7 becomes insignificant with a low t statistic of 
0.40 and a high p value of 0.687, showing an insignificant relationship between 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors and recommendations under this specific condition. 
Base on the analyst-firm fixed-effect model, we can conclude that ACAT is persistent 
for a given analyst, which implies that ACAT is an analyst characteristic. In other 
words, if the ACAT would be significant even when we control for analyst fixed-
effect, then we would have to conclude that while forecast errors and 
recommendations tend to correlate in a given point in time, they fluctuate for a given 
analyst. The fact that the correlation between forecast errors and recommendations is 
uncorrelated at the analyst-firm level, suggests that ACAT is an analyst characteristic 
at the firm level. This is rather interesting result that desires further investigation, for 
example, it would be worthwhile to know if ACAT is related to an analyst talent or 
analyst knowledge on different companies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
     We examine the consistency between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and 
recommendations by performing several t-tests and regressions. Even though the 
results of the two-by-two matrix and two-sample t-tests are slightly different from 
what we predict, we still find a significant positive linear relationship between 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors and their recommendations through the simple 
linear regressions. We also include several control variables such as year, industry, 
firm and analyst into the regression model in order to test the degree of ACAT 
hypothesis. As a result, the regression results survive year, industry, firm and analyst 
fixed-effect specifications, and seem to be rather robust. Hence, we find that analysts 
tend to be consistent in their earnings forecast errors and recommendations at 
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different levels. However, the ACAT hypothesis does not hold in the case where 
aggregate variations across both analysts and firms are eliminated, revealing that 
ACAT is an analyst characteristic at the firm level. 
     Overall, the regression results align with past literature on objectivity illusion but 
could also support the idea that the consistency is due to analysts’ rationale. Whether 
illusion or rationality plays a role in this consistency is not the basis of our finding but 
a worthwhile question that we hope future researcher will follow. 
 
Table 3 
 
Regression analysis: 
Forecast Errors = a1 + b1 * Recommendations + u                                                                (1) 
Forecast Errors = a2 + b2 * Recommendations + c1 * log (MC) +d1 * BTM + u                    (2)      
Forecast Errors = a3 + b3* Recommendations + c2 * log (MC) +d2 * BTM  
                              +e1 * Year fixed effects + u                                                                               (3) 
Forecast Errors = a4 + b4 * Recommendations + c3* log (MC) +d3 * BTM  
                              +e2 * Year fixed effects + f1 * Industry fixed effects+ u                                          (4) 
Forecast Errors = a5 + b5 * Recommendations + c4* log (MC) +d4 * BTM  
                              +e3 * Year fixed effects + g1 * Firm fixed effects + u                                              (5) 
Forecast Errors = a6 + b6 * Recommendations + c5* log (MC) +d5 * BTM  
                              +e4 * Year fixed effects + h1 * Analyst fixed effects + u                                          (6)                                           
Forecast Errors = a7 + b7 * Recommendations + c6* log (MC) +d6 * BTM  
                             +e5 * Year fixed effects + i1 * Firm fixed effects _ Analyst fixed effects+ u                   (7)                                             
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recommendations 
 
0.0079 0.0077 0.0081 0.0083 0.0083 0.0102 0.0037 
3.11*** 3.08 *** 3.24*** 3.38*** 3.56*** 3.72*** 0.40 
Log (Market 
Capitalization) 
 -0.0306 -0.0309 -0.0379 0.0083 -0.0380 -0.0078 
 -10.41*** -10.48*** -11.82*** 0.29 -9.31*** -0.13 
Book-to-market ratio  0.0138 0.0137 0.0081 0.0266 0.0086 0.0279 
 5.61*** 5.55*** 3.12*** 2.08**  2.36*** 1.32 
Year fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects    Yes    
Firm fixed effects     Yes  Yes 
Analyst fixed effects      Yes Yes 
Interpret  -0.0022 0.2768 0.2610 0.2165 -0.1166 0.3273 0.0445 
 -0.23 9.10*** 8.58*** 5.07*** -0.43 8.46*** 0.08 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0002 0.0050 0.0053 0.0159 0.2326 0.0746 0.3443 
Observations 59290 59290 59290 59287 59290 59290 59290 
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